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THE ARYAN MYTH AND TAJIKISTAN: 
FROM A MYTH OF EMPIRE 
TO ONE NATIONAL IDENTITY*
Although infamous as part and parcel of Nazi race ideology and dubbed 
an “Aryan myth” by Léon Poliakov,1 the idea of an Aryan race continues to 
figure prominently in nationalist discourses in various countries, including 
India and Iran.2 The government in Tajikistan went so far as to commemo-
rate the fifteenth anniversary of national independence in 2006 with the 
proclamation of a “year of the celebration of the Aryan civilization.”3 This 
and related propaganda efforts reveal the centrality of the idea of the Tajiks’ 
* This article is based on the paper presented at the seminar “Boundaries of History” at 
HSE St. Petersburg on December 8, 2016. Support from the Basic Research Program of the 
National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged. 
The author would like to thank Alexander Morrison, Alexander Semyonov, the editors of 
Ab Imperio, and two attentive anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestion. 
1 See, for instance: Christopher Hutton. Race and the Third Reich: Linguistics, Racial An-
thropology and Genetics in the Dialectic of Volk. Cambridge, 2005. P. 80; Léon Poliakov. 
The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe. New York, 1974.
2 Romila Thapar. The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics // Social 
Scientist. 1996. Vol. 24. No. 1-3. Pp. 3-29; Reza Zia-Ebrahimi. Self-Orientalization and 
Dislocation: The Uses and Abuses of the “Aryan” Discourse in Iran” // Iranian Studies. 
2011. Vol. 44. No. 4. Pp. 445–472. 
3 Jumhuriat [Republic] (Tajikistani governmental daily newspaper). 2006. September 
14. P. 1.
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Aryan descent for the contemporary Tajik nationalist discourse.4 The present 
study examines the origins of this idea in the early twentieth century and 
argues that Tajikistan’s imagining and formation as a nation-state is inextri-
cably linked to the way it was articulated by imperial scholars-turned-Soviet 
orientalists,5 such as Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Semenov (1873–1958).
*     *     *
“For our ancestors, the Aryan civilization marked the beginning of his-
tory [oghozi ta’rikh],” proclaimed the president of Tajikistan in 2006.6 His 
words illustrate the basic function of the ancient Aryans, namely, to confer 
on those evoking them the status of indigenousness and autochthony.7 
Poliakov has described the Aryan myth as the expression of an urge that is 
common among various human groups, “namely that of claiming a distinc-
tive origin, an ancestry which is both high-born and glorious.”8 The Tajiks’ 
Aryan ancestors serve the same political purpose and feed the same urge. 
Contrary to what nationalist ideologues like to suggest, the origins of the 
Aryans lie not in time immemorial but in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-cen-
tury European scholarship. The idea of an Iranian Aryan race, for example, 
rather than being rooted in the ancient appellation ariya, as is often claimed, 
is in fact “a re-import into Persian of the European concept of ‘Aryan,’” 
as Reza Zia-Ebrahimi has argued.9 Similarly, the intellectual genealogy of 
4 According to Sergei Abashin, the Aryan theme is “one of the most important symbolic 
assets of Tajik nationalism.” See Sergei Abashin. Natsionalizmy v Srednei Azii: v pois-
kakh identichnosti. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 202.
5 I am calling Semenov an orientalist in both the conventional and the Saidian sense. He 
was an orientalist because he was professionally engaged in the academic study of the 
history of the Muslim societies of Central Asia. He was also an orientalist insofar as he 
was a representative of both Russian imperial and Soviet rule in Central Asia and, as 
such, located right at the heart of the nexus of the exercise of imperial domination and 
production of “colonial knowledge” that Edward Said has identified (see Edward W. 
Said. Orientalism. New York, 1979). Like British colonial administrators and oriental-
ists in India, who assumed that the “society … they were governing, could be known 
and presented as a series of facts,” and “that administrative power stemmed from the 
efficient use of these facts,” Semenov wished to see orientalist scholarship applied to 
make colonial rule more efficient. See Bernard S. Cohn. Colonialism and its Forms of 
Knowledge: The British in India. Princeton, 1996. P. 4. 
6 Jumhuriat. 2006. September 14. P. 1.
7 Victor Shnirelman. Aryans Or Proto-Turks? Contested Ancestors in Contemporary 
Central Asia // Nationalities Papers. 2009. Vol. 37. No. 5. P. 569.
8 See Léon Poliakov. The Aryan Myth. P. 2.
9 Reza Zia-Ebrahimi. Self-Orientalization. P. 446.
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the Tajiks’ Aryan ancestors can be traced back to late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century European and especially Russian scholarship. According 
to Marlène Laruelle, late nineteenth-century Russian Oriental studies “had 
developed a very clear ‘tajikophily’ and ‘ariophily’ that was denounced by 
key figures of Turkology such as Vassili Bartol’d (1869–1930),” and which 
was subsequently refined by Soviet scholars, such as Bobojon Gafurov 
(1908–1977), to prove the autochthonous status of the Tajiks in Central 
Asia.10 
Another key actor in this context was Aleksandr Semenov, who was an 
influential proponent of the hypothesis of the Tajiks’ Aryan descent, a pupil 
and friend of Bartol’d and an early academic mentor of Gafurov. Born in 
the Tambov province in 1873 into a merchant family of Tatar ancestry and 
modest means, Semenov graduated from Moscow’s Lazarev Institute of 
Oriental Languages in 1900 to embark on a remarkable career in the co-
lonial administration of Russian Turkestan. The revolution in 1917 forced 
him to reinvent himself as a Soviet orientalist and occasional government 
adviser on various cultural and educational affairs in Central Asia. Having 
spent most of his life working in several leading academic institutions in 
Tashkent, in 1951 Semenov followed the invitation of his former student 
and now first secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Gafurov, to 
move to Stalinabad (Dushanbe) and become the director of the Ahmad 
Donish Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of Tajikistan’s 
newly established Academy of Sciences.11 
Semenov remained in this post until his death in 1958, when the former 
colonial administrator became unequivocally canonized in the pantheon of 
Soviet academia. His biographers (and students) Boris Litvinskii and Nari-
man Akramov have described him somewhat euphemistically as “one of the 
most distinguished Soviet orientalists of the old generation,” thus remind-
ing us of the fact that Semenov had played a prominent role both under the 
ancien régime and the Soviet state.12 But his career should be of interest to 
scholars of the late imperial and early Soviet periods not just because of its 
10 Marlène Laruelle. The Return of the Aryan Myth: Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized 
National Ideology // Nationalities Papers. 2007. Vol. 35. No. 1. P. 55.
11 This article is based largely on materials held in Semenov’s personal archive and library 
at the Ahmad Donish Institute. References to this archive are marked “A.A.S., bx, fy,” 
meaning: Archive Aleksandr Semenov, box x, folder y.
12 Semenov’s biography was published in Moscow in 1971. Its editor in chief was none 
other than Gafurov, by then the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR’s 
Academy of Sciences. See Boris Litvinskii and Nariman Akramov. Aleksandr Aleksan-
drovich Semenov. Nauchno-Biograficheskii Ocherk. Moscow, 1971. P. 3.
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prominence, timing, and duration but also for its locality: Semenov lived 
and worked in Central Asia for six decades, participating in the region’s 
transformation from a colony of the Russian Empire into a part of what 
Francine Hirsch has called an “Empire of Nations.”13
In Hirsch’s vein, this article argues that Semenov was part of a “revolu-
tionary alliance” of former imperial scholars and the Bolsheviks that was 
based on “a shared appreciation for scientific rule.”14 It is telling in this 
respect that since 1918 he was regularly in touch with the Indologist and per-
manent secretary of the Imperial Academy of Sciences Sergei Ol’denburg,15 
whom Hirsch regards as a central figure in this alliance.16 Unlike Hirsch, 
I think that Semenov joined this revolutionary alliance not out of interest 
in “scientific government” or the Bolsheviks’ efforts to modernize and 
transform society, but in order to pursue his own research interests. Rather 
than focusing on groups of scholars, as Hirsch has done, this article takes 
the microhistorical perspective of singling out one exemplary biography. 
The case of Semenov highlights the context-setting effect of the imperial 
situation that unpredictably transformed initial meanings and intentions of 
the Bolshevik nationalities policy. More specifically, through the lens of a 
single life, this study explores how certain academic fashions and paradigms 
and Semenov’s determination to continue his research and protect its object 
(Persianate Central Asian culture) influenced the local Central Asian dynam-
ics of Soviet nationalities policy.
The article’s focus on the continuity throughout the divide of 1917 (in-
cluding the evolving Aryan theme) resonates with Vera Tolz’s and Adeeb 
Khalid’s argument about the need to see Soviet nationalities policy in the 
context of discourses on nationhood and ethnicity that were articulated by 
Russian and Central Asian elites during the late imperial period.17 By the 
same token, the article is distanced from the research agenda of the Early 
Soviet studies of the turn of this century. Thus, it will not discuss how and 
why the Bolsheviks were promoting “the national consciousness of … ethnic 
minorities and establishing for them … institutional forms of the nation-
13 Francine Hirsch. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the 
Soviet Union. Ithaca, 2005.
14 Ibid. P. 21.
15 Correspondence between Semenov and Ol’denburg is held in the St. Petersburg Branch 
of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Fond 2. Op. 1-1918. No. 1.
16 Francine Hirsch. Empire of Nations. P. 21.
17 Vera Tolz. Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the 
Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods. Oxford, 2011. P. 135; Adeeb Khalid. The Politics 
of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley, 1998. P. 2.
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state,” as Terry Martin has done,18 or study “cultural technologies of rule” 
such as “enumeration, mapping, and surveying,” as Hirsch did.19 At the same 
time, it will also not concentrate on reconstructing the role of Central Asian 
Muslim intellectuals and political actors in the making of the Central Asian 
Soviet Republics, as scholars such as Khalid, Arne Haugen, Paul Bergne, and 
Adrienne Edgar have done.20 This is a story about continuity, but more the 
continuity of the former imperial educated elite than the former colonials. 
While other scholars, such as Litvinskii and Akramov and, more recently, 
Sergei Abashin and Alisher Ilkhamov, have studied Semenov’s role in writ-
ing Tajik and Uzbek national histories and forging official national identi-
ties during the 1940s and 1950s,21 this article sheds light on the earlier and 
less explored period of Semenov’s life. Specifically, I am interested here in 
the history of transforming an Aryan myth of empire into a myth of Tajik 
national identity during the late imperial and early Soviet periods. While 
corroborating Laruelle’s argument about the origins of the Tajik Aryan myth 
in late nineteenth-century Russian orientalist scholarship, the present study 
also suggests that what ingrained this myth in Tajik nationalist discourse 
were the political arguments and rivalries among Central Asian and Euro-
pean advocates of Tajik and Uzbek statehood in the immediate aftermath 
of the establishment of Tajikistan during the so-called National Territorial 
Delimitation (NTD) of the 1920s. It was in this local Central Asian context 
of the NTD that the notion of the Tajiks’ Aryan descent was increasingly 
employed to demarcate and differentiate Tajik from Uzbek national identity.
Adeeb Khalid has stressed the importance of the local dynamics of the 
NTD, arguing that “Muslim intellectuals, not Soviet ethnographers or party 
18 Terry Martin. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca, 2001. P. 1.
19 Hirsch. Empire of Nations. P. 12.
20 Adeeb Khalid. The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform; Idem. Making Uzbekistan: 
Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR. Ithaca, 2015; Paul Bergne. The 
Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic. London, 2007; 
Arne Haugen. The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia. Basing-
stoke, 2003; Adrienne Lynn Edgar. Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan. 
Princeton, 2006. 
21 Litvinskii and Akramov. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Semenov; Sergei Abashin. Eth-
nogenesis and Historiography: Historical Narratives for Central Asia in the 1940s and 
1950s // Roland Cvetkovski and Alexis Hofmeister (Eds.). An Empire of Others: Creat-
ing Ethnographic Knowledge in Imperial Russia and the USSR. Budapest, 2014. Pp. 
145–171; Alisher Ilkhamov. Iakubovskii and Others: Canonizing Uzbek National History 
// Florian Mühlfried and Sergey Sokolovskiy (Eds.). Exploring the Edge of Empire: 
Soviet Era Anthropology in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Berlin, 2011. Pp. 237–259.
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functionaries, were the true authors of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek nation.”22 
As my research shows, in practical terms, it is difficult to clearly differentiate 
between these groups of people. They collaborated and opposed each other 
simultaneously, in different sociopolitical contexts of what can be called 
the imperial situation.23 The “making of Tajikistan” appears to have been 
a process in which both European experts, such as Semenov, and Central 
Asian intellectuals, such as Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954), participated. The 
scholarship and activism of Semenov and some of his colleagues influenced 
NTD’s delimitation of borders and identities, even though this process 
was highly contingent on local Central Asian conditions.24 The notion of 
the Tajiks’ Aryan descent is not only an example of this influence but also 
a reminder of the fact that the idea of a Tajik nation – notwithstanding its 
nature as the by-product of an insurgent Uzbek nationalism25 – was rooted 
in an earlier imperial situation, which had paved the way for its emergence. 
Reviewing Making Uzbekistan, Abashin has suggested looking for “an earlier 
genealogy” of the “idea of Tajikistan.”26 My argument is that the concept of 
a distinct Tajik “ethnicity” or “nation” was a prerequisite for the establish-
ment of a Tajik state, and that Russian orientalists who helped producing 
this concept were one part of this genealogy. 
The Aryans: from an Indo-European family of languages to a family 
of peoples
The Aryans were an imagined entity primarily constructed on the basis 
of language. They were the creation of comparative philology, which had 
22 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 15.
23 The group of researchers associated with Ab Imperio has suggested avoiding “a uni-
versal theory or a generic definition of empire,” and working instead “with a model of 
the imperial situation defined by the tensions, incongruity, and incommensurability of the 
languages of self-description.” See Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber and Alexander Semyonov 
(Eds.). Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the 
Russian Empire. Leiden, 2009. P. 23. 
24 It should not be read as part of what Sebastian Conrad has identified as “a metanar-
rative, … [that] assumes a general process of modernization that originated in Europe 
and was then gradually disseminated around the globe.” See Sebastian Conrad. What is 
Global History? Princeton, 2016. P. 73. 
25 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 291.
26 Sergei Abashin. Review: Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and 
Revolution in the Early USSR (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
415 pp., ills. Bibliography. Index. ISBN: 978-0-8014-5409-7 // Ab Imperio. 2016. Vol. 
17. No. 4. Pp. 263−264.
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become fashionable since the end of the eighteenth century, following 
William Jones’s (1675–1749) discovery of close resemblances between 
European languages, on the one hand, and Sanskrit and Persian, on the 
other. On the basis of this discovery, the hypothesis of an Indo-European 
language family emerged. Deduced from this hypothesis was the concept 
of a primal population of Indo-European speakers, who were given a name 
taken from Sanskrit – Aryans.27 However, this linguistic understanding of 
the Aryans did not remain unchallenged. According to Stefan Arvidsson, 
scholars have tended to define “‘the Indo-European branch of humanity’ 
… either as the group of people who spoke some Indo-European language 
… or as the group of Aryans, who were typically imagined as tall, blond, 
and blue-eyed specimens of homo sapiens.”28 While the former culturalistic 
definition initially dominated the scholarship on the Indo-European subject, 
it was soon challenged by a more naturalistic approach, which was promoted 
by racial anthropologists eager to define the Aryans in physical terms.29
The Indo-European subject intrigued scholars and intellectuals throughout 
Europe, not least because it promised to shed light on the origins of their lan-
guages and peoples. Laruelle suggested that Russian intellectuals embraced 
the notion of their nation’s Aryan descent because it provided Russia with 
its own link to a hypothetical Indo-Iranian or Aryan ancestry in the ancient 
Orient.30 Marina Mogilner has found that Russian scholars embraced racial 
anthropology and the idea of an Aryan race and sometimes even claimed that 
the Russians were among the most homogeneous groups of Aryans.31 Accord-
ing to Tolz, some Russian scholars, led by Vasilii Grigor’ev (1816–1881), 
“identified the Aryan historic homelands in Central Asia or in Siberia.”32 
The notion of a Central Asian Aryan homeland frequently went hand 
in hand with the view that people of Aryan descent had survived in the 
isolation of the region’s mountains. The Norwegian-German Indologist 
Christian Lassen (1800–1876) first portrayed “the Hindu Kush as a place 
where racially pure Aryans still live.”33 Many scholars identified these 
27 Stefan Arvidsson. Aryan Idols: Indo-European Mythology as Ideology and Science. Chi-
cago, 2006. P. 10; Thomas R. Trautmann. Aryans and British India. Berkeley, 1997. P. 2.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. P. 313.
30 Marlène Laruelle. Mythe Aryen et Rêve Impérial Dans la Russie du XIXe Siècle. 
Paris, 2005. P. 22, 47.
31 Marina Mogilner. Homo Imperii: A History of Physical Anthropology in Russia. 
Lincoln, 2013. Pp. 11, 178.
32 Tolz. Russia’s Own Orient. P. 60.
33 Arvidsson. Aryan Idols. P. 20.
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Aryans with the Tajiks and in particular with the so-called Mountain Tajiks 
or Galcha, as the Pamiri peoples were called by most scholars at the time.34 
The Austro-Hungarian ethnographer Charles de Ujfalvy (1842–1904), for 
example, regarded the Tajiks of northern Persia and Turkestan as well as the 
Galcha of the valleys neighboring the Pamirs, as the ancestors of Europe’s 
own alleged Aryan forefathers.35 Likewise, Franz von Schwarz (1847–1903), 
the German director of the Turkestan Meteorological Institute, published 
Turkestan: The Cradle of the Indo-Germanic Peoples in 1900, which argued 
that the Tajiks’ “type [Typus, i.e., physiognomy] resembles the one of the 
unalloyed [unvermischt] descendants of the Indo-Germanic [i.e., Aryan] 
aborigines [of Turkestan], the Galcha.”36 Both authors’ emphasis on physi-
cal appearance illustrates how much the theory of an Indo-European family 
of languages had evolved since its humanistic-philological beginnings. By 
1900, the Aryans were no longer imagined merely as a family of speakers 
of an Aryan Ursprache but as a racial community. 
The Aryan myth of empire: Count Bobrinskii’s Pamirs expedition of 
1898 
The Aryan myth was not only a myth of national origins and identity but 
also a legitimizing narrative of Russia’s imperial expansion into Central Asia, 
as Laruelle and, more recently, Alexander Morrison have pointed out.37 It cast 
this expansion as an imperial reconquest of the alleged ancient Central Asian 
homeland of the Aryans by the “new Aryans” – the Russians.38 As early as 
1877 members of the imperial elite propagated the idea that it was Russia’s 
historical destiny to liberate her Aryan brethren in Central Asia’s mountainous 
34 “Galcha” (or “Ghalcha”) was exclusively a foreign appellation, which was used by the 
Persian speakers of the plains and by some speakers of Turkic to signify the Iranophone 
mountain dwellers of Eastern Bukhara (present-day Tajikistan). Lutz Rzehak. Vom Per-
sischen zum Tadschikischen: Sprachliches Handeln und Sprachplanung in Transoxanien 
Zwischen Tradition, Moderne und Sowjetmacht (1900–1956). Wiesbaden, 2001. P. 20.
35 Charles de Ujfalvy. Les Aryens au Nord et au Sud de L’Hindou-Kouch. Paris, 1896. P. 8.
36 Franz von Schwarz. Turkestan, die Wiege der Indogermanischen Völker. Nach Fün-
fzehnjährigem Aufenthalt in Turkestan Dargestellt von Franz V. Schwarz. Freiburg im 
Breisgau, 1900. P. 8.
37 Laruelle. Mythe Aryen. Pp. 13,138; Alexander Morrison. Scramble on the Roof of the 
World: The Russian Exploration and Annexation of the Pamirs, 1876–1905 // Alexan-
der Morrison. The Russian Conquest of Central Asia 1814–1907: A Study in Imperial 
Expansion (forthcoming). 
38 Laruelle. Mythe Aryen. P. 138.
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regions from the Turkic yoke.39 This narrative applied particularly strongly 
to the Pamirs and its vicinity, which retained a special place in the public and 
scholarly imagination as the likely Aryan Urheimat. Turkestan’s governor-
general Aleksandr Vrevskii (1834–1910) reproduced this narrative during the 
opening ceremony of the Turkestan Circle of Devotees of Archaeology in 
December 1895 (in the aftermath of the Russo-British border agreement in the 
Pamirs40): “Today fate has led us – Aryans, to the places whence once upon 
a time our ancestors have come … [and] where once blossomed the Aryan 
culture that we are now asked to restore.”41 These words and the context 
in which they were uttered hint at the synergy between imperial expansion 
and scholarly exploration that Semenov and some of his contemporaries 
benefited from. 
One opportunity that arose from this synergy between empire and aca-
demia was the 1898 Pamirs expedition by the Russian nobleman and amateur 
ethnographer Aleksei Bobrinskii (1861–1938), which took place under the 
aegis of the Moscow University-based Society of Devotees of Natural Sci-
ence, Anthropology, and Ethnography.42 Semenov was in his mid-twenties 
and still a student when he joined Bobrinskii and the zoologist Nikolai 
Bogoiavlenskii (1987–1930) to visit Darvaz,43 Qarategin,44 and parts of the 
Bukharan plain bordering with Afghanistan.45 This was when he first encoun-
tered the Iranophone inhabitants of that region whom he called Mountain 
Tajiks.46 Daniel Beben has stressed that Bobrinskii’s expedition produced 
some of the earliest studies on the Pamiri peoples and on the religious tradi-
tions of the adherents of the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam in the region.47 The 
trip had a profound impact on Semenov’s formation as a scholar. It marked 
39 Morrison. Scramble on the Roof.
40 Seymour Becker. Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–
1924. Cambridge, MA, 1968. P. 122.
41 Valerii Germanov. Turkestanskii kruzhok liubitelei arkheologii: primat nauki ili geopoli-
tiki? // http://mytashkent.uz/2010/02/25/turkestanskiy-kruzhok-lyubiteley-arheologii/. 
42 V. P. Terekhov. Iz istorii pamirovedeniia: tri ekspeditsii grafa A. A. Bobrinskogo // 
Etnograficheskoe Obozrenie. 2011. No. 2. P. 33. 
43 Darvaz is divided today between Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province 
and the Badakhshan province of Afghanistan.
44 Today’s Rasht Valley in Tajikistan. 
45 Terekhov. Iz istorii pamirovedeniia. P. 33.
46 von Schwarz. Turkestan. P. 8.
47 Daniel Beben. The Legendary Biographies of Nāṣir-i Khusraw: Memory and Textu-
alization in Early Modern Persian Ismāʻīlism / PhD dissertation; Indiana University, 
2015. P. 29. 
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the beginning of his lifelong fascination with the history and literary heritage 
of what he regarded as Central Asia’s Iranian or Persianate culture in general 
and with the teachings of Ismailism in particular. After his return to Moscow, 
Semenov wrote his dissertation at the Lazarev Institute about the dialects 
of the Mountain Tajiks.48 A further result of his liaison with Bobrinskii was 
his first major scholarly publication Ethnographic Outlines of the Zarafshan 
Mountains, Qarategin and Darvaz, which was published in 1903.49 These 
and subsequent publications cemented Semenov’s reputation as a scholar. 
Notwithstanding its academic significance, it is important to regard the 
expedition of 1898 in the context of empire.50 First, the expedition enjoyed 
the imperial state’s patronage. In 1896 Governor-General Vrevskii had 
reminded the vice-president of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society 
about the need to study the Pamirs and its vicinity.51 In addition, on the eve 
of the expedition Russia’s first professor of physical anthropology, Dmitrii 
Anuchin (1843–1923),52 wrote a letter of support of Bobrinskii to the minis-
ters of foreign affairs and war, Mikhail Murav’ev (1845–1900) and Aleksei 
Kuropatkin (1848–1925), respectively.53 The latter responded by sending 
a similar note to the Bukharan Emir Abd al-Ahad Khan (1859–1911), who 
in his turn – in the words of Nikolai Bogoiavlenskii – “placed our expedi-
tion under his auspices, assigned one of his court officials to us and issued 
a firman declaring us his, the emir’s, guests.”54 Second, Bobrinskii was one 
of the most prominent voices calling for the extension of Russian patron-
age over the supposedly Aryan inhabitants of the empire’s borderlands and 
for the official recognition of the Ismailis as an independent denomination. 
Publishing the results of his first Pamirs expedition in 1902, he suggested 
to “extend the hand of friendship to the sectarians ..., [and to] officially 
acknowledge their existence and, thereby, shield them from the yoke of the 
48 Aleksandr Semenov. Materialy dlia izucheniia narechiia gornykh tadzhikov Tsentralnoi 
Azii. Vol. 1: Grammaticheskii ocherk i pamiatniki narodnogo tvorchestva. Moscow, 1900; 
Vol. 2: Pamiatniki narodnogo tvorchestva i slovar’. Moscow. 1901.
49 Aleksandr Semenov. Etnograficheskie ocherki Zarafsanskich gor, Karategina i Darvaza. 
Moscow, 1903. 
50 For a theoretical take on the concept of empire “as a context-setting category that 
frames the historical reconstruction of a historical context,” see Alexander Semyonov. 
Empire as a Context Setting Category // Ab Imperio. 2008. No. 1. P. 199. 
51 Davlat Khudonazarov. Pamirskie ekspeditsii grafa A. A. Bobrinskogo 1895–1901 
godov: Etnograficheskii albom. Moscow, 2013. P. 55.
52 Mogilner. Homo Imperii. P. 133.




official Sunnism of the Bukharans.”55 He depicted the Ismailis as “a fertile 
ground for the instillment of Russian culture …,” and argued that it would 
be “easy to turn them into devoted friends and, thereby, to create a loyal 
and trustworthy bulwark against the enemies of Russian rule in Asia at the 
distant frontier and at the crossroads of three states.”56 
Bobrinskii’s advocacy of the official recognition of the Ismailis as an 
independent denomination legitimized imperial rule over them. But there 
was more to his words than just imperialist wishful thinking. Compared to 
the preceding more violent stages of the Russian conquest of Central Asia, 
resistance against the annexation of the Pamirs was weak.57 This helps to 
explain why, according to Wolfgang Holzwarth, “Bobrinskii’s concept of 
trading loyalty to the state for the protection of minorities proved workable 
between 1905 and 1918.”58 Much to Semenov’s advantage, it led to an 
opening up of Ismaili religious dogmas and philosophical convictions that 
hitherto had been shrouded in secrecy. 59 
Bobrinskii’s sympathetic and patronizing stance toward the Ismailis was 
fully in line with the common Orientalist cliché of the “noble savage.”60 
Reviewing one of Bobrinskii’s works on the subject, Semenov stressed that 
the author suspects “the traces of an ancient aristocratic race, the Aryan 
one, … in these mountain dwellers.”61 The review highlighted “the author’s 
affectionate attitude toward … the Mountain Tajiks,” who had been “cast 
to these harsh lands of peaks enshrouded in clouds and the blinding glare 
of permanent snow and ice by the will of fate and various peripeteias of 
history.”62 Needless to say, the notion of the downtrodden Mountain Tajiks, 
who had been “harassed, dispossessed in a struggle beyond their strength” 
and forced into the inaccessible mountains “by bad fate or by a ruthless des-
55 A. A. Bobrinskii. Sekta Ismailia v russkikh i bukharskikh predelakh Srednei Azii // 
Etnograficheskoe obozrenie. 1902. No. 14. P. 18.
56 Ibid.
57 Morrison. Scramble on the Roof.
58 Wolfgang Holzwarth. Die Ismailiten in… Nordpakistan: zur Entwicklung einer re-
ligiösen Minderheit im Kontext neuer Aussenbeziehungen. Berlin, 1994. P. 36.
59 Ibid.
60 See, for instance, Dane Kennedy. Guardians of Edenic Sanctuaries: Paharis, Lepchas, 
and Todas in the British Mind // South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. 1991. Vol. 
14. No. 2. Pp. 57–77.
61 Aleksandr Semenov. Bobrinskii, A. A. Gortsy verkhov’ev Piandzha (Vakhantsy i 
Ishkashimtsy). Ocherki byta po putevym zametkam. (Review) // Etnograficheskoe 
obozrenie. 1909. No. 1. P. 99.
62 Ibid.
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pot or victor” was part of a narrative legitimizing imperial rule.63 However, 
more surprising is the fact that this narrative reemerged as part of the official 
rationale behind the establishment of a Tajik autonomy within Uzbekistan in 
1924 because it allowed the portrayal of Tajik territorial political autonomy 
as an affirmative and compensatory measure to right past wrongs. Its logic 
is even more apparent in the wording of the initial proposal for the creation 
of a modest Tajik Autonomous Province from 1924:
The offer of autonomy to this province is especially significant, 
since no nation … has been subjected to such a long and heavy op-
pression as has the mountain Tajik nation. Driven by the victorious 
Turks into the inaccessible mountainous ravines, they were forced to 
lead a half-starved existence.64
What Bobrinskii had promoted as imperial patronage, Semenov would 
help to refashion as Soviet affirmative action.65 The well-tried notion of the 
downtrodden Mountain Tajiks dovetailed with the compensatory antico-
lonialism promoted by the Bolsheviks during the 1920s. Semenov was of 
course not the only expert popularizing this view. Bartol’d, whose opinion 
carried more weight than Semenov’s, penned a report to the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the Soviet government in December 1929, in which he 
criticized the view that it was somehow a national trait of the Tajiks to live 
in the mountains. He argued that “the Turks had forced the … ‘ancestors 
of the Tajiks’ … ‘out of the plains and into the mountains.’”66 Similarly, 
three years earlier the former colonial administrator, orientalist, and Se-
menov’s colleague, Pavel Vvedenskii (1880–1938), who was a member 
of a Special Commission for Tajikistan Affairs (formed in 1926 under the 
auspices of the Central Asian Economic Bureau), described the Tajiks “as 
an ‘oppressed nation’ because, … they had been expelled by tribal groups 
into the mountains.”67 
Vvedenskii’s terminology followed the logic of what Martin has defined 
as one of the premises of Soviet affirmative action, namely, the colonial 
premise and the greatest-danger principle, which – as Lenin wrote in 
1914 – “distinguished between the nationalism of oppressor nations and 
63 Ibid. 
64 Bergne. Birth of Tajikistan. P. 48. Unfortunately, the author of the proposal is unknown.
65 For the concept of Bolshevik nationalities policy as a form of affirmative action, see 
Terry Martin. The Affirmative Action.
66 Hirsch. Empire of Nations. P. 184.
67 Botakoz Kassymbekova. Humans as Territory: Forced Resettlement and the Making 
of Soviet Tajikistan, 1920–38 // Central Asian Survey. 2011. Vol. 30. No. 3–4. P. 355.
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the nationalism of oppressed nations.”68 At the same time, his words also 
echoed what Bobrinskii and Semenov had written about the Mountain 
Tajiks long before affirmative action was even thought of. In other words, 
although Semenov’s voice in this context was neither the loudest nor the 
one closest to the government’s ear during the 1920s, he was nonetheless 
one of the pioneers of the study of Ismailism and the Mountain Tajiks and 
a recognized authority in that field.69 As such, he had an equally important 
influence on the emergence of what Paul Bergne has called “a Tajik per-
secution myth” – a myth that was of course closely related to that of the 
Tajiks’ Aryan descent.70 
The Tajiks as Aryan brethren 
Semenov’s writing on the Tajiks was influenced by tropes that were 
characteristic of the wider scholarship on the Aryans (or Indo-Europeans) 
at the time, such as the notion of kinship between the Europeans and their 
supposed “Aryan brethren” in Asia. It seems instructive to compare his 
portrayal of the Mountain Tajiks in his texts resulting from the Bobrinskii 
expedition with the picture of a Tajik nation of Aryan descent that he drew 
in an unpublished work from the 1920s. 
The Mountain Tajiks
“The first European scholars to investigate Badakhshān and its people in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century considered the region to be 
the preserve of Aryan races undiluted by the mixtures of Turkic and Mongol 
blood found in the lowland regions of Central Asia.”71 This conclusion also 
applies to Semenov and the work on the Mountain Tajiks that he published 
as a result of the Bobrinskii expedition. “About the Beliefs of the Mountain 
Tajiks,” for example, which was published in 1900, was concerned with “the 
mountain dweller’s … old perennial beliefs and customs, which have almost 
68 Martin. The Affirmative Action. P. 7.
69 According to Beben, “the true beginnings of the study of the Central Asian Ismāʿīlī tradi-
tion rests entirely upon the shoulders of three Russian scholars: Ivan Zarubin, Wladimir 
Ivanow, and Aleksandr Semenov.” See Beben. The Legendary Biographies. P. 30. The 
renowned orientalist Ignatii Krachkovskii called Semenov “our prime authority in the 
field of the history of the Ismaili movement.” See Ignatii Krachkovskii. Die russische 
Arabistik: Umrisse ihrer Entwicklung. Leipzig, 1957. P. 166.
70 Bergne. Birth of Tajikistan. P. 128
71 Beben. The Legendary Biographies. P. 5.
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disappeared among his kinsman – the Valley Tajiks.”72 In a similar vein, 
Semenov’s Ethnographic Outlines of the Zarafshan Mountains, Qarategin 
and Darvaz introduced the geographical setting of the study as a region 
that is “highly revered in the legends of the primeval [pervobytnye] Indo-
Iranians.”73 Hinting at traces of an ancient pre-Islamic Iranian civilization, 
he wrote that the Mountain Tajiks “call their ancestors by the generic name 
‘otash-parast,’ that is, fire worshippers,” and that they mention “the ancient 
prophet Zoroaster” when speaking about their past.74 
The work also contains a rare example of Semenov explicitly venturing 
into the realms of racial anthropology. Some Mountain Tajiks, he wrote, 
“resemble in their typical facial features the population of our Great Rus-
sian provinces and the German plains.”75 All these quotes are in line with 
what was characteristic for the scholarship on the Aryan subject at the 
time. That said, it is worth pointing out that Semenov did not use the term 
“Aryan” explicitly. Where he did use that term, for instance, in his reviews 
of Bobrinskii’s The Mountaineers of the Upper Reaches of the River Panj, 
he did so carefully. Reviewing the book favorably, he wrote that the author’s 
research on the culture of certain Pamiri peoples provided “a thoughtful 
historian-orientalist [istorik-orientalist] and philologist-Iranologist … with 
much material … for thought about the ancient aspects of the way of life of 
the Aryan tribes.”76 The reason Semenov did use the word “Aryan” in this 
context is that he was referring to the hypothetical ancient Aryans, traces 
of whose culture he believed to be reflected in the contemporary customs 
and beliefs of the Pamiri peoples. 
Race was certainly an underlying, unquestioned and occasionally sur-
facing assumption in Semenov’s above-mentioned works. His research, 
especially that on the Mountain Tajiks, was part of and influenced by what 
Mogilner has called the “universal discourse” of race, which during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was “a dominant epistemology, an 
instrument that unlocked nearly all social, cultural, and political phenomena 
in the world.”77 Semenov did not have to be a craniologist in order to none-
theless assume that race existed and was a historical category with explana-
72 Aleksandr Semenov. Iz oblasti religioznykh verovanii gornykh tadzhikov // Etnogra-
ficheskoe obozrenie. 1900. No. 4. P. 81.
73 Semenov. Etnograficheskie ocherki. P. 1.
74 Ibid. P. 19.
75 Ibid. P. 26.
76 Semenov. Bobrinskii, A. A. Gortsy verkhov’ev Piandzha. P. 99.
77 Mogilner. Homo Imperii. P. 2.
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tory power. Still, it is hard to overlook that he was much more interested in 
the culture of the Mountain Tajiks than in their looks, and that his research 
concerned not race but language and especially the “old perennial beliefs 
and customs” of an elusive bygone ancient pre-Islamic Iranian civilization, 
which was of course a hobbyhorse of Aryan studies.78
Aryan brethren
Semenov’s vision of the Tajiks hallmarks another prominent theme of the 
research on the Aryan subject, namely, that of a brotherhood of Aryan peoples, 
which was a founding paradigm of research on the subject.79 Interestingly, 
this is particularly apparent in Semenov’s texts from the early Soviet period. 
In these, he married the older Aryan rhetoric with the concept – at the time 
topical – of national self-determination. A good example is the unpublished 
article “A Short Outline of the Historical Fortunes of the Tajik People,” which 
appears to have been written around 1924, and which introduced the Tajiks 
as “the most ancient inhabitants of Central Asia … who belong to the Asian 
representatives of the great Indo-European family of peoples [narodov].”80 
The last sentence of the article even described “the talented Tajik people 
[narod]” as the “eastern brother of the European nations [natsii].”81 
The inversion of the inclusive portrayal of the Tajiks as the Europeans’ 
Indo-European brethren is the exclusion of the Turkic, Mongol (and Arabic) 
“invaders.” Anticipating contemporary Tajik nationalist discourse, Semenov 
proclaimed that whereas the rule of “the local Iranian national dynasty of the 
enlightened Samanids” led to “a ‘golden age’ of … Persian literature,” the 
subsequent “hegemony of the Turks … was a gloomy period in the history 
of the Tajiks.”82 Furthermore, this vision of Central Asian history equated 
“high culture” with Tajik culture: “The Tajik people, even after having lost 
its political dominance, preserved the light of high cultural achievements 
in this country.” Semenov added that their “Aryan genius [ariiskii genii]” 
manifested itself “in local architecture, fretwork and ironwork, in magnifi-
cent ceramics, … in exquisite miniatures, and … literature.”83 In the same 
vein, the article painted a picture of “the Tajik people” as the bearer of “the 
inextinguishable light of pan-human [obshchechelovecheskii] culture.” They, 
78 Semenov. Iz oblasti religioznykh. P. 81.
79 Trautmann. Aryans and British. P. 172.
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“like all Persians,” withstood oppression, preserved “their national essence 
[natsional’naia sushchnost’]” and even instilled “part of their own spirit 
[dukh] onto their conquerors, the Arabs, Turks and Mongols.”84 Semenov 
went on to prophesy a bright future for the liberated and self-determining 
Tajik nation (natsiia): 
Now that it has been led onto the broad path of autonomous activity 
[samodeiatel’nost’], the Tajiks will undoubtedly succeed in liberat-
ing their primordial essence from the admixtures/impurity [primes’] 
overshadowing it.85
In other words, Tajik national self-determination would allow the original 
Aryan genius to blossom unfettered by alien impurities. Here we are not too 
far from the notion of racial hygiene. 
When compared to Semenov’s writings about the Mountain Tajiks at the 
turn of the century, the text above demonstrates a more racialized approach 
resonating with the dominant language and tropes of the “Aryan studies” 
of the time. One such trope was, according to Arvidsson, “the opposition 
between the Iranians or Aryans, ‘people of the plow’…, and the Turanians, 
the warlike and barbaric nomads.”86 Semenov’s juxtaposition of the Tajiks’ 
“light of high cultural achievements” with the alleged cultural decline 
under the “hegemony of the Turks,” but also the metaphor of light and the 
expression “Aryan genius” contrasted supposedly ingenious Aryans to un-
imaginative Semites.87 This binary model had been popularized by influential 
French authors such as Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882) and Ernest 
Renan (1823–1892), who conceptualized the history of the Muslim world 
as a struggle between a génie sémitique and a génie aryen, depicting the 
former in a negative light and conferring to the latter the virtues of creativ-
ity, reason, and culture.88 Semenov and some Russian authors opposed the 
Aryans not to Semites but to Turks, thereby avoiding anti-Semitic overtones 
only to replace them with anti-Turkic ones. 
In this respect, he seems to have been influenced by Agafangel Efi-
movich Krymskii (1871–1942), an orientalist, poet, and famous Ukrainian 
nationalist, who was also one of his favorite teachers at the Lazarev Insti-
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid. 
86 Arvidsson. Aryan Idols. P. 58.
87 Ibid. P. 318.
88 Laruelle. Mythe Aryen. P. 173; Mark Batunsky. Racism in Russian Islamology: Aga-
fangel Krimsky // Central Asian Survey. 1992. Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 79.
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tute.89 Krymskii viewed Islamic societies through a racist and dichotomous 
prism, which opposed allegedly creative and rational Aryans (and Semites) 
to supposedly dull and fanatic Turks (and Mongols).90 This Persophile and 
Turkophobe vision of Central Asian history informed the Tajik nationalist 
narrative of history that Semenov helped to devise during the 1920s, and 
which until today defines Tajik (Iranian/Aryan) national identity against 
an Uzbek (Turkic) “other.” It sat easily with an Aryan myth of empire that 
cast the Russian annexation of the Pamirs as the revival of beneficial and 
civilizing Aryan rule. It underlays both Bobrinskii’s promotion of imperial 
patronage over the Mountain Tajiks and Semenov’s advocacy of national 
self-determination for the Tajik “eastern brother of the European nations.” 
 
Sharpening the contours of Tajik national identity
The concept of Tajik history that Semenov promoted during the 1920s was 
a far cry from the view of his teacher Bartol’d, who stressed that “the his-
tory of the cultured regions of Central Asia and the history of such nomadic 
empires [as the Mongol empire] constitutes one almost inseparable whole.”91 
In one of his articles from 1914 he condemned “prejudiced assertions about 
races … [and] the exaggerated notion of the cultural achievements of the 
Aryans and the barbarity of the Turks.”92 Semenov was familiar with his 
teacher’s views and the above-mentioned text, which “[he] read … with 
the greatest interest,” as he told Bartol’d in a letter.93 Why then did he not 
manage to avoid the pitfalls of the Aryan discourse? The answer to that 
question lies in the political context of the NTD, which turned the Aryan 
myth into a myth of Tajik national identity. Semenov’s writings from the 
time not only bear the marks of this development, they helped to bring it 
about. By juxtaposing the Tajiks as racially Aryan and Iranophone aborigines 
to invading Turks, they facilitated the conceptualization of the Tajiks as a 
distinct and autochthonous nation within the entangled sociocultural milieu 
of the Central Asian sedentary population. 
89 Nina A. Kuznetsova. Obzor arkhiva akademika Tadzhikskoi SSR A. A. Semenova // 
Nina Kuznetsova (Ed.). Iran: Sbornik Statei. Moscow, 1971. P. 29. I am grateful to Paolo 
Sartori for bringing Kuznetsova’s survey to my attention.
90 Batunsky. Racism in Russian. Pp. 75–84.
91 Vasilii Bartol’d. Sostoianie i zadachi izucheniia istorii Turkestana // V. V. Bartol’d. 
Sochineniia. Vol. 9. P. 512.
92 Vasilii Bartol’d. Zadachi russkogo vostokovedeniia v Turkestane // V. V. Bartol’d. 
Sochineniia. Vol. 9. P. 529.
93 A.A.S. B13. F6. P. 46: Letter from A.A.S. to V. V. Bartol’d, 8.1.1915.
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The NTD delimited national territories and identities. Demarcating Uz-
beks from Tajiks proved particularly cumbersome. As Khalid put it, “sepa-
rating ‘Uzbek’ or ‘Turk’ from ‘Tajik’ or ‘Iranian’ was not simply a matter 
of separating different colored marbles from a jar.”94 The meaning of these 
designations was contextual and varied over time and place. Scholars, such 
as Bert Fragner, Eva Maria Subtelny and John Samuel Schoeberlein-Engel, 
have emphasized the interdependency, symbiosis, and fluidity of Tajik and 
Uzbek identity in late imperial and early Soviet Central Asia.95 In the same 
vein, Khalid has stressed that “Persian and Turkic speakers lived deeply 
interconnected lives, in which customs and practices were identical, bilin-
gualism common, and language never a node of identity.”96 
Semenov was well aware of this “symbiosis of Turk and Tajik,” to use 
Eva Maria Subtelny’s expression. He knew that heterogeneity was the rule 
rather than the exception in Central Asia. In 1911, for instance, he wrote a 
review of the book Tapisseries de l’Asie Central, criticizing its too schematic 
portrayal of the ethnic groups of the Bukharan Khanate.97 He stressed that 
“Uzbeks ..., Tajiks …, Persians …, Kirgiz …, Turkmen …, Arabs …, Jews 
as well as Lyuli,98 and Aralash [from the Turkic verb aralashmaqk for ‘to 
mix’]” lived much more intermingled than the book suggested.99 The NTD 
left little room for such ambiguity and sought to divide Central Asia and its 
population into clear-cut national categories and republics. The schematic 
view of the Tajiks as the Iranophone descendants of Central Asia’s Aryan 
aborigines provided such clarity. It buttressed Tajik claims to autochthony 
94 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 292.
95 Bert Fragner. The Nationalization of the Uzbeks and Tajiks // Edward Allworth (Ed.). 
Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics and 
Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Durham, 1994. Pp. 13–33; Eva 
Maria Subtelny. The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik // Beatrice Manz (Ed.). Central Asia 
in Historical Perspective. Boulder, 1998. Pp. 45–61; John Samuel Schoeberlein-Engel. 
Identity in Central Asia: Construction and Contention in the Conceptions of “Özbek,” 
“Tâjik,” “Muslim,” “Samarqandi” and Other Groups / PhD dissertation; Harvard Uni-
versity, 1994.
96 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 292.
97 A. A. Semenov. Kovry russkogo Turkestana // Etnograficheskoe obozrenie. 2011. No. 
1. P. 138.
98 The Lyuli are a subgroup of the Dom People, a branch of the Central Asian Roma. 
For more information, see Shirin Akiner. Enduring Stranger: Mughat, Lyuli, and Other 
Peripatetics in the Social Fabric of Central Asia // Joseph C. Berland and Aparna Rao 
(Eds.). Customary Strangers: New Perspectives on Peripatetic Peoples in the Middle 
East, Africa, and Asia. Westport, CT, 2004. Pp. 299–307.
99 A. A. Semenov. Kovry russkogo Turkestana. P. 148.
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and sharpened the contours of Tajik national identity by clearly distinguish-
ing it from the Uzbeks, who were categorized as of Turkic origin. This lack 
of ambiguity is even more striking if one bears in mind that there had been a 
strong late imperial academic tradition in which “hybridity was perceived as 
a foundation of the norm” and “mixed racial type” had been a key concept.100 
Incidentally, Semenov’s above-mentioned text, too, categorized people as 
being of Turkish, Iranian, or mixed Turko-Iranian origin.101 The paradox 
of the NTD was that its promotion of national republics and autonomies 
attempted to encourage diversity by eliminating ambiguity. 
Thus, in order to facilitate singling out a distinctive ethnic group, Russian 
scholars identified the unambiguous Idealtyp of an Aryan or Iranian Tajik 
population only with the Mountain Tajiks. Stressing the role of Russian 
orientalists in promoting Tajik nationhood in 1924, Paul Bergne noted that 
it was the Mountain Tajiks, “who struck … them as different in manners, 
culture and appearance” from the urban dwellers of the plains.102 Semenov 
was among these orientalists. He was one of the most prominent scholars who 
had written on the subject of the Mountain Tajiks and Ismailis in the decades 
before the NTD. Moreover, he acted as a consultant to those carrying out and 
preparing the NTD. In 1924 the authorities of the Turkestan Soviet Socialist 
Republic commissioned him to produce what he described to Bartol’d as “a 
historical-ethnographical outline of Turkestan, written on the orders (to put 
it mildly) of the journal The National Economy of Central Asia.”103 
As one can judge from this testimony, Semenov had little choice but to 
partake in the NTD, which he regarded primarily as a nuisance and unnec-
essary administrative shakeup.104 He delivered the study “On the Problem 
of the National Delimitation of Central Asia (A Historical-Ethnographic 
Outline),” which opened with a reminder of the region’s ethnic heterogene-
ity and interconnectedness and of the fact that a “repartition [pereraspre-
delenie] of Turkestan in accordance with the ethnography and way of life 
of the population” had already been attempted and abandoned during the 
100 Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov and Marina Mogilner. Hybridity: Marrism and the 
Problems of Language of the Imperial Situation // Ab Imperio. 2016. Vol. 17. No. 1. 
Pp. 42, 57.
101 A. A. Semenov. Kovry russkogo Turkestana. P. 138.
102 Bergne. Birth of Tajikistan. P. 127.
103 A.A.S. B13. F6. P. 132: Letter from A.A.S. to V. V. Bartol’d on 27.01.1925.
104 In another letter to Bartol’d (from November 1924), Semenov wrote: “Here there is 
total perturbation in all institutions because of the delimitation. Who will be sent to other 
cities? Who will be closed down? The inventory and funds are being divided.” A.A.S. 
B13. F6. P. 188: Letter from A.A.S. to V. V. Bartol’d from November 1924.
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1880s.105 Describing the Tajiks as one of the “Iranian” and “indigenous” 
peoples of Central Asia, the paper reiterated the notion of the Mountain 
Tajiks as the quintessential Tajiks:
The mixing of the Tajiks of the plain with other peoples affected 
their type [tip] and the purity of their Persian language …. The Moun-
tain Tajiks, on the other hand, isolated by the mountains from the 
numerous vicissitudes of this country’s history, have preserved their 
Aryan type and language in great purity.106
Subsuming both the “Tajiks of the plains and the Mountain Tajiks” under 
the category of one Iranophone people on the basis of their alleged Aryan 
descent, these lines propagated among intellectuals and political actors in 
Soviet Central Asia the view of the region’s entire Iranophone population 
as a people distinct from the remaining Turkic population. 
It is important not to overstate the political influence of scholars such as 
Semenov. Adeeb Khalid even went as far as to dismiss this role altogether, 
arguing that the “opinions of experts played almost no role in the delibera-
tions over the drawing of new boundaries in 1924.”107 The problem is that 
there was also no support for a Tajik state among Central Asian urban elites, 
which Khalid himself duly notices: “Persian-speaking intellectuals and 
political actors did not identify themselves as Tajiks and did not therefore 
seek rights for a Tajik nation.”108 Likewise, Haugen has stressed that it was 
“virtually impossible to identify a Tajik voice in the deliberations” concern-
ing the NTD.109 If so, it remains unclear who the primary locomotive of 
promoting a Tajik national compound was. 
I would suggest that the relative significance of voices such as Semenov’s 
was a function of this lack of support for the project of a Tajik nation among 
the local educated elite. Gero Fedke, Sergei Abashin, and, most explicitly, 
Adeeb Khalid have argued that Tajikistan was in effect a place of exile for 
those who had lost political battles in Uzbekistan.110 This hypothesis looks 
105 A.A.S. B10. F2. P. 1; Aleksandr Semenov. K probleme natsional’nogo razmezhevaniia 
Srednei Azii (istoriko-etnograficheskii ocherk) // Narodnoe khoziaistvo Srednei Azii. 
1924. No. 2-3. Pp. 26–40.
106 Ibid.
107 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 270.
108 Ibid. P. 291.
109 Haugen. The Establishment. P. 150. 
110 Gero Fedtke. How Bukharans Turned into Uzbeks and Tajiks: Soviet Nationalities 
Policy in the Light of a Personal Rivalry // Paolo Sartori, Tommaso Trevisani (Eds.). 
Patterns of Transformation in and around Uzbekistan. Reggio Emilia, 2007. Pp. 
19–50; S. N. Abashin. Natsionalizmy. P. 190; Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. Pp. 291–315. 
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plausible, but it does not explain the establishment of Tajikistan in the first 
place. “Tajik” might have been a residual category, but why did it acquire 
the status of a distinct nationality and find acceptance as such at all? I am 
suggesting that the prominent place the Mountain Tajiks enjoyed in the Rus-
sian (and wider European) scholarship and imagination as Aryans – kindred 
“noble savages” and oppressed aborigines of Central Asia – raised their 
profile and facilitated their classification as a separate nationality entitled 
to Soviet affirmative action in the form of political autonomy. Semenov 
aided the transformation of the category “Tajik” from what it had been 
for centuries prior to the Russian conquest (a sociocultural category rather 
than an ethnicity) into an ethnolinguistic notion, which was the nucleus 
of the idea of a Tajik nation and state.111 Bartol’d captured the essence of 
this transformation in his entry “The Tajiks” in the Encyclopedia of Islam. 
Published in 1925, it highlighted both the modernity of the term “Tajik” as 
an ethnolinguistic classification and its political importance as a prerequisite 
for the establishment of a Tajik nation-state: 
Nowadays … the Russians subsume under the name “Tajik” all 
Iranian peoples of Turkestan – both the Tajiks as such, that is, the 
population that speaks Tojiki …, and the mountain peoples … who 
have a special status in terms of language. In keeping this usage of the 
term, the autonomous republic of Tajikistan was created in 1924.112 
Semenov’s rationale for promoting the idea of a Tajik nation of 
Aryan descent
Ascribing Aryan ancestry to the Tajiks allowed Semenov to portray 
and study Tajik history in connection with Iranian history and in a wider 
regional context. The Aryan theme helped him to represent Tajik and Central 
Asian history for what he believed it to be: not peripheral, provincial, and 
homogeneous, but significant, cosmopolitan, and best understood in a wider 
regional context. This is why one of his texts criticized Edward Browne’s 
(1862–1926) A Literary History of Persia for paying too little attention to 
Central Asian poets, thereby tearing “an entire page of great importance … 
111 Bert Fragner has argued that speaking an Iranian language was not the decisive criterion 
of falling under the sociocultural category “Tajik” as the “nominal precursors” of the 
modern Tajiks. Persian-speaking nomads, for instance, would not have been included in 
it, but the “settled, nontribal or detribalized groups of the population that were influenced 
by Iranian culture.” See Fragner. The Nationalization. P. 15.
112 Vasilii Bartol’d. Tadzhiki (iz Entsiklopedii islama) // V. V. Bartol’d. Sochineniia. Vol. 
2. Part I. Moscow, 1964. P. 470. 
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out of the common literary history of the Iranians.”113 Alfrid Bustanov has 
stressed that although the NTD was inimical to the writing of regional his-
tory, Semenov and some of his colleagues from the Bartol’d school did not 
give up their regional perspective.114 
Part of that perspective was also identification of certain population 
groups in the transnational category of Aryans, as Semenov’s article “Mate-
rial Monuments of Aryan Culture” attests. Published in 1925, it described 
the “the current Tajik republic” as “merely an insignificant part of the 
rich archaeological inventory of the Aryans of Central Asia,” and as “one 
of many details in the overall picture of the country’s history … [which] 
cannot be seen in separation from the remaining parts of the picture.” 115 
Advocates of a “Greater Tajikistan” would later refer to this text to buttress 
their territorial claims.116 But Semenov’s intent had not been to spur Tajik 
irredentism, but merely to write about Central Asia’s past from a regional 
perspective. 
Apart from promoting regionalism, writing Tajik history as “Aryan” had 
another advantage. In the context of the political struggles accompanying 
the NTD, it was important not only to differentiate Tajiks from Uzbeks (by 
stressing the “Iranianness” of the former) but also to dissociate Tajik iden-
tity from Iran as a foreign country and from the Persian court culture of the 
Emirate of Bukhara as a major immediate predecessor of Soviet Turkestan. 
Bolsheviks and most of their Central Asian allies were busy discrediting the 
political legacy of Bukhara as the bulwark of Islamic bigotry.117 The associa-
tion of Tajiks with Aryans allowed the framing of their national project in 
categories unconditioned by any contemporary political or cultural realities 
and factors. Even in the historical perspective it rooted the Tajiks in Central 
Asia’s own, presumably Aryan, past rather than in ancient Persia as such, 
thereby bolstering a myth of Tajik autochthony. 
The status of autochthons was important not only because it improved 
the chances of being acknowledged as one of the Soviet Union’s so-called 
113 A.A.S. B12. F4. Pp. 1–9: Kratkii ocherk.
114 Alfrid K. Bustanov. Soviet Orientalism and the Creation of Central Asian Nations. 
London, 2014. P. xx. 
115 A. A. Semenov. Material’nye pamiatniki ariiskoi kul’tury” // N. L. Korzhenevskii 
(Ed.). Tadzhikistan: sbornik statei. Tashkent, 1925. P. 113.
116 Abashin. Natsionalizmy. P. 190.
117 Bert Fragner. Sowjetmacht und Islam: Die Revolution von Buchara // Hans Robert 
Roemer, Ulrich Haarmann and Peter Bachmann (Eds.). Die islamische Welt zwischen 
Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65. Geburtstag. Wi-
esbaden, 1979. P. 153.
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titular nations. In the Tajik case, it also helped to uphold the very idea of a 
distinct Tajik nation against a Turkist vision of Central Asia that left little 
space for Persianate culture. According to Khalid, the Turkist point of view 
was that “Central Asians who spoke Persian did so under the influence of 
morally corrupt royal courts.”118 
One of the earliest and most influential written manifestations of Tajik 
nationalism, an anthology of Tajik-Persian poetry titled Specimen of Tajik 
Literature, meant to counter this Turkist perspective on Tajik identity.119 Its 
author was Sadriddin Aini, a poet from the vicinity of Bukhara, who emerged 
as a leading Tajik intellectual in the 1920s. Aini expicitly mentioned the role 
of the book as an argument on the conflict with Turkist claims for hegemony 
in an autobiographical statement dating from 1949. Resorting to the ideo-
logical trope of the struggle of progressive Bolsheviks versus reactionary 
Pan-Turkists (optionally also Pan-Islamists or Pan-Iranists), Aini wrote that 
his book used “precise historical facts” to silence Pan-Turkists who claimed 
that “there is no such people as the Tajiks in Central Asia ... [and that] the 
Tajiks are simply Uzbeks who have lost their native Uzbek language under 
the influence of the Iranians and the madrasa.”120 
One such historical fact was the Tajiks’ alleged Aryan descent. This 
thesis allowed the Tajiks to be connected not so much to the Persians as to 
their supposed mutual Aryan ancestors. Moreover, if recognized as the most 
authentic Aryans, the Tajiks turned out to be not of Persian origin but the 
ancestors of Persians themselves. “In Turkestan one can discern in the Tajiks 
a more archaic proto-Persian,” Semenov wrote in an unpublished paper.121 
Arguing in the same vein that Tajik literature “reflects the entire versatility 
of the Aryan genius,” he located the source of creative endeavor in Persian 
not in a foreign country (Iran) but in the “genius” of the Tajiks’ own Aryan 
ancestors.122 Aini echoed this notion in his Specimen of Tajik Literature, in 
which he attributed “the flourishing of the Tajik language and literature” in 
Central Asia not to “the rule of the Samanids or … the immigration of Ira-
nians …,” but to “the existence in these lands of a great people by the name 
of ‘Tajik,’ which belongs to the Aryan race [ki mansub ba irqi Orist].”123
118 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 258.
119 The book was commissioned by the Tajik authorities in the spring of 1925 and pub-
lished the next year only to be banned in 1930. 
120 Sadriddin Aini. Sobranie sochinenii. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1971. P. 118.
121 A.A.S. B12. F14. Pp. 1–4: “Stat’ia o Turkestane.” 
122 Ibid.
123 Sadriddin Aini. Namunai Adabiëti Tojik. Dushanbe, 2010. P. 4.
178
Matthias Battis, The Aryan Myth and Tajikistan
The question thus arises as to why Semenov and some of his colleagues 
decided to promote the thesis of the Tajiks’ Aryan descent around the time 
Tajikistan was established. First of all, it is important to point out that they 
acted in accord with the fledgling Tajik government. A case in point is Se-
menov’s “Material Monuments of Aryan Culture,” which opened with the 
claim that “the Tajiks … are, as is well known, the descendants of the ancient 
aborigines of the country, the Aryans of Asia.”124 The ink had barely dried on 
the decision to establish the Tajik Republic when this text by Semenov was 
published in 1925, in Tajikistan: A Volume of Articles. The collection also 
contained a chapter by Bartol’d, in which he complained that the constitu-
tion of the Turkestan Soviet Socialist Republic (1918–1924) had failed to 
acknowledge the indigenous status of “the country’s most ancient inhabitants, 
the Tajiks.”125 Bartol’d concluded with what was essentially policy advice: 
“The future will tell to what extent the historical delimitation in 1924 will 
further the national rebirth of the Tajik nationality.”126 
His words show that the volume was not just prepared during the NTD 
but addressed it directly. It had been commissioned and financed by the pro-
visional government of the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic – the 
Revolutionary Committee (Revkom).127 It was published by the Society for 
the Study of Tajikistan and the Iranian Peoples beyond Its Borders, which 
had been founded in Tashkent in January 1925 on the initiative of the Tajik 
Revkom (and listed Semenov among its founding members).128 Its foreword 
acknowledged the support of Abduqodir Muhiddinov (1892–1934), who 
led the Tajik government between 1926 and 1928, Nusratulla Makhsum 
(1881–1938), the head of the Tajik Revkom and the honorary chairman of 
the Society for the Study of Tajikistan, and Andrei Znamenskii (1887–1943), 
who was “the actual Chairman” of the Society for the Study of Tajikistan.129 
The latter was also the plenipotentiary of the USSR’s People’s Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs in Central Asia, without whose support the volume would 
probably not have been published. 
124 A. A. Semenov. Material’nye pamiatniki. P. 113.
125 V. V. Bartol’d. Tadzhiki – Istoricheskii ocherk // V. V. Bartol’d. Sochineniia. Vol. 2. 
Part I. P. 468.
126 Ibid.
127 Rzehak. Vom Persischen. P. 160.
128 Efim Solomonovich Shagalov. Pervoe Nauchnoe Obshchestvo Tadzhikistana. Dusanbe, 
1966. P. 7; D. S. Saidmuradov, I. S. Mal’tsev. Iz istorii vostokovedeniia v Tadzhikistane, 
1917–1958 gg. Dushanbe, 1990. Pp. 19–26.
129 N. L. Korzhenevskii. Foreword // N. L. Korzhenevskii (Ed.). Tadzhikistan.
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According to Bergne, Znamenskii had become concerned with the rise 
of Turkism in the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic (1920–1925) and 
“called on other academics to defend the rights of the Tajiks.”130 Evidently, 
Semenov’s and his colleagues’ advocacy of Tajik national self-determination 
was sanctioned by the Soviet authorities. In this sense, Khalid is right to have 
pointed out that “the political process [of the NTD] reshaped ethnographic 
knowledge to a certain extent,” rather than the other way around.131 Still, in 
the Tajik case the protest by leading experts on Central Asia such as Bartol’d 
and Semenov against the state’s failure to take notice of “the country’s 
most ancient inhabitants” (in the words of Bartol’d), appears to have been 
effective in putting Tajikistan on the map, both literally and metaphorically.
In addition to the political imperatives of the NTD and competing local 
national projects, Semenov and other Soviet specialists in Iranian studies 
were driven by their own personal interests in what I call the indigenization 
(korenizatsiia) of Persianate culture in Soviet Central Asia. Indigenizing 
Persianate culture, that is, conceptualizing it as the national culture of an 
indigenous Tajik nation (rather than as an Iranian or Persian import), greatly 
enhanced its political status and cultural significance in the USSR. Represent-
ing Persianate culture as an inherent and indispensable part of Central Asian 
heritage meant that it was becoming a legitimate object of study eligible 
for Union-wide promotion and subsidizing. Orientalists were among the 
beneficiaries of this official recognition, even though cultural indigeniza-
tion with its essentialized perception of Tajiks contradicted Semenov’s own 
regionalist understanding of Central Asian history. 
The personal methodological compromise enabled him, Aini, and others 
to salvage Central Asia’s rich Persian literary heritage for the Soviet future in 
the guise of Tajik national culture. Under the constraints of the early Soviet 
Cultural Revolution, it was safer to cast the Persianate culture as the mani-
festation of the people’s “Aryan genius” rather than as the legacy of a corrupt 
and foreign court culture. Here, the Aryan theme was a means to this end, not 
the end itself. The indigenization of Persianate culture was thus inextricably 
linked to the NTD. It was a reaction to the threat of its being marginalized as 
a foreign (Iranian) import and relic of a “feudal” past. According to Khalid, 
“the explosion of Turkism in 1917 … meant a disavowal of Persian and the 
heritage it represented.”132 In January 1925, a Tashkent newspaper called 
on Tajiks to “immediately begin [using] the Uzbek language,” describing 
130 Bergne. Birth of Tajikistan. P. 150.
131 Khalid. Making Uzbekistan. P. 270.
132 Ibid. P. 293. 
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Persian as a “useless and superfluous language,” whose fate had been sealed 
by “the path of socialist progress.”133 If Persian was to shed its negative im-
age as elitist and a remnant of a discredited ancien régime, it needed to be 
anchored in Central Asia’s supposed perennial and truly popular Aryan past. 
The indigenization of Persianate culture was part of a wider regional 
process that predated Soviet power. The Persian language had already 
come under pressure in the decades preceding the NTD. According to Lutz 
Rzehak, its demise in Central Asia must be seen within the context of a 
wider intraregional process that led to “the end of the dominance of the 
Persian language in large swathes in Western, Central, and South Asia and 
neighboring regions.”134 Bert Fragner has conceptualized this dominance of 
Persian as the Persophonie, that is, the spatiotemporal area in which Persian 
was the universal language of literature and often also the vernacular.135 The 
rise of colonialism and nationalism during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries led to the dissolution of this Persophonie. The English (and the 
Urdu) replaced Persian in India; Iranian and Afghan intellectuals reframed 
the Persian language and culture in national Iranian and Afghan terms, 
respectively; and in Central Asia, Persian demised with the rise of Turkism 
and the ascent of Russian.136 
The indigenization of Persianate culture that followed the establishment 
of Tajikistan in 1924 should be seen against this background of Persian ceas-
ing to serve as the lingua franca. While the NTD gave a boost to the Persian in 
Soviet Central Asia as it acquired the status of Tajikistan’s national language, 
the language itself underwent a radical transformation. Forsi, that is, the 
language of prestige that had dominated the spheres of religion, literature, 
science, administration, and trade for almost a millennium in Transoxiania, 
was replaced by Tojiki, “a language whose function was largely reduced to 
that of the primary language of a community of speakers defined by national 
criteria.”137 This transformation from Forsi to Tojiki was concomitant with 
the imagining of Central Asia’s Iranophone population as “the Tajiks.” It 
relied on the conflation of race and language, more precisely, on the conflated 
notion that Persian was part of the Aryan family of languages and the Tajiks 
members of the Aryan family of peoples.
133 Rahim Masovich Masov. Tadzhiki: istoriia natsional’noi tragedii. Dushanbe, 2008. P. 51.
134 Rzehak. Vom Persischen. P. xi.
135 Bert Fragner. Die “Persophonie”: Regionalität, Identität und Sprachkontakt in der 
Geschichte Asiens. Berlin, 1999. Cited in Rzehak. Vom Persischen. P. xi.
136 Ibid.




Ironically, the Aryan myth in Tajikistan – a product of imperial social 
sciences that was thoroughly rooted in the imperial context – became most 
forcefully expressed during the 1920s heyday of Soviet anti-imperialism. 
From an argument legitimizing Russian imperial rule in the region it evolved 
into a myth of Tajik national identity and origin. A major proponent of this 
myth, Aleksandr Semenov, embodies its dialectic of continuity and radically 
changed meaning as he himself played an important role in the region both 
before and after 1917, albeit in a somewhat changed capacity. In the 1920s, 
he would use the purely speculative concept of Aryan origins much more 
blatantly than he had done before 1917 in order to consolidate discursively 
the blurry and contested Tajik national identity. In doing so, Semenov per-
formed several roles simultaneously, including as an expert in the service 
of the newly established Tajik government and as a scholar with a research 
agenda of his own. Even in the latter capacity his motivation for promot-
ing the Tajik Aryan myth was manifold. On the one hand, he had a strong 
Persophile bias and conceptual worldview. On the other, he pragmatically 
strived to secure the official recognition of and government funding for his 
research interests in Persianate Central Asia. 
The political effect of Semenov’s portrayal of the Tajiks as the descen-
dants of the Aryan aborigines of Central Asia and the victims of predomi-
nantly Turkic conquerors was the legitimization of both late imperial and 
early Soviet rule over territories that are part of present-day Tajikistan. To be 
sure, the Aryan hypothesis was not Semenov’s single-handed invention.138 
But due to his unique sociopolitical role in the 1920s, he gave this hypoth-
esis a powerful impetus from his position as a scholarly authority officially 
recognized by the regime. In doing so, Semenov served as a medium through 
which a seemingly anti-Marxist concept was transferred into the early Soviet 
period. Moreover, during the 1920s, he employed the Aryan theme in a par-
ticularly racialized manner not typical of his own earlier work. This version 
of the Aryan myth conflated race and language in order to categorize the 
Tajiks as Iranians and differentiate them from various categories of Turkic 
peoples of Central Asia. In doing so, he helped to essentialize the contested 
138 The scholar and traveler Armin Vambery (1832–1913) had already documented exactly 
the same narrative in 1868. According to him, some of those who were called Tajiks were 
uncomfortable with that name, deeming it to be an “expression of contempt with which 
the Oezbeg [Uzbek] conquerors regard the subdued aborigines.” See Armin Vambery. 
Sketches of Central Asia: Additional Chapters on My Travels, Adventures, and on the 
Ethnology of Central Asia. London, 1868. P. 334.
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Tajik national identity and, by the same token, to legitimize the establish-
ment of the Tajik state. One of the most influential Tajik intellectuals, the 
late Mohamadjon Shakuri, explicitly mentioned Semenov and Bartol’d as 
having been among the Russian scholars who “spoke out in defense of the 
Tajik people” during the early 1920s.139 
The degree to which Semenov actually was a champion of the Tajik 
national cause is an open question. It is worth bearing in mind that he acted 
under immense political pressure and as a representative of what he most 
likely regarded as the successor to the Russian empire. Thomas Trautmann 
has described the British Sanskritists as “empire loyalists ... for whom the 
relation of their intellectual work to the governance of India was by no 
means concealed or shamefaced.”140 Semenov, too, was an empire loyalist 
who facilitated imperial Russian and Soviet rule in Central Asia. But he was 
also a scholar who made use of the little leeway he had to act in his own 
personal and professional interests and, as such, an advocate of the preserva-
tion and study of Persianate culture. The notion of the Tajiks’ Aryan descent 
was – like that of race – an unquestioned and underlying assumption in his 
work, which otherwise was primarily concerned with culture. He reacted 
to the perceived threat of the marginalization of Persianate culture in early 
Soviet Central Asia by emphasizing and connecting the cultural argument 
with the political discourse of Tajik national self-determination, which may 
or may not be a purely tactical device. 
We can conclude with more certainty that Semenov’s career, his handling 
of the Aryan myth, and his engagement with politics were influenced by the 
local dynamics of the NTD and had grown out of experience of studying 
and ruling Central Asia during the late imperial period.
SUMMARY
This article examines the intellectual genealogy of a central tenet of 
contemporary nationalist discourse in Tajikistan, namely, the Aryan myth 
as the idea of the Tajiks’ Aryan descent. The origins of this myth are dis-
covered in Late Imperial Russia. Over the first decades of the twentieth 
century, through the early Soviet period, the Tajik Aryan myth would 
transform from a narrative legitimizing Russian imperial rule to a myth of 
Tajik national identity. The article shows how Tajikistan’s imagining and 
formation as a nation-state was inextricably linked to the Aryan myth and 
139 Mohammadjon Shakuri. Panturkizm va sarnavishti todzhikon. Dushanbe, 2010. P. 132.
140 Trautmann. Aryans and British India. P. 19.
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to the way it was articulated by imperial scholars-turned-Soviet oriental-
ists, such as Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Semenov (1873–1958). Taking the 
microhistorical perspective of a single life allows the author to highlight the 
local Central Asian dynamics of the complex imperial situation that paved 
the way to and accompanied Bolshevik nationalities policy. As a scholar 
with a certain political weight, Semenov managed to exploit the leeway 
for action in accordance with his own research interests (rather than acting 
as a mere instrument of the imperial and Soviet regimes in Central Asia). 
Consequently, the article argues that the process of delimiting borders and 
identities in 1920s Central Asia was influenced not only by Moscow-based 
Bolsheviks and leading Central Asian Muslim political figures but also by 
Russian orientalists as distinctive historical actors.
Резюме
В статье исследуется интеллектуальная генеалогия центрального 
элемента современного националистического дискурса в Таджикиста-
не: “арийского мифа” как представления об арийском происхождении 
таджиков. Истоки этого мифа обнаруживаются в позднеимперской 
России. На протяжении первых десятилетий ХХ в., в раннесоветский 
период, таджикский арийский миф трансформировался из нарратива 
легитимации российского имперского господства в миф о таджикской 
национальной идентичности. В статье показывается, как изобретение 
и создание Таджикистана как национального государства было нераз-
рывно связано с арийским мифом, во многом обязанным своим появ-
лением А. А. Семенову (1873–1958), имперскому ученому, ставшему 
ведущим советским востоковедом. Микроисторический подход и фокус 
на истории жизни конкретного человека позволили автору реконструи-
ровать местную среднеазиатскую динамику многогранной имперской 
ситуации, которая проложила дорогу большевистской национальной 
политике и во многом предопределила ее. Как ученый, обладающий 
определенным политическим влиянием, Семенов сумел склонить не-
устойчивую ситуацию в направлении, наиболее отвечающем его личным 
научным интересам (вместо того, чтобы действовать в качестве инстру-
мента в руках имперского или советского режима в Средней Азии). В 
итоге, в статье делается вывод о том, что размежевание национальных 
границ и идентичностей в Средней Азии 1920-х гг. происходило под 
влиянием не только центральной большевистской власти и местных 
среднеазиатских мусульманских лидеров, но и российских востокове-
дов как самостоятельного исторического фактора.
